SENZA CENSURA N.
37
July - October
‘12
CLASS STRUGGLE WITHOUT CLASSES?
Two years of defeats for the Greek Movement
The poin of wiew of “Collettivo
Prezzemolo (*)” about the results of the struggles and about the perspective in
Greece
The question we are examining in this article is the Greek movements'
perspectives after more than two years of bitter defeats and disastrous
austerity. Although it is difficult, even for us Greeks, to examine and analyze
in depth this issue - moving beyond the impressive TV images showing buildings
in flames and hundreds of thousands of people filling the streets of Athens –
conducting this analysis is absolutely necessary, for two reasons.
1) First of all, in order to understand the reasons for which the
movements opposing austerity in Greece have, until now, failed. This is,
indeed, what has happened: The movements did not manage to stop the austerity
storm which is striking the Greek society.
2) And then, it is necessary in order to address a broader question, in
order to note which mobilization experiences may be shared, and which lessons
one might learn from the Greek case. This point is especially timely for
today’s Italy.
The movements which oppose the austerity measures in Greece are the
society’s response to the “salvation maneuvers” imposed on the country by the
Greek government and its creditors, i.e. the so-called “Troika” - composed by
the IMF, the ECB and the EU.
Their development can be divided in three phases:
1) from May 2010 to May 2011: The traditional mobilization. This phase
was characterized by a -sort of- repetition of mobilization forms and means
used in the past in Greece: General Strikes, demonstrations, violent clashes
with the police, and so on.
2) from May to August 2011: The “indignados” mobilization: During this
period, the Greeks, inspired by the Arab Spring and the Spanish “indignados”,
squatted the main Squares in Athens and all the other cities of Greece and held
daily, peaceful demonstrations. Although the acampadas held an impressive, positive
influence on the Greek society, their main goal, which was to block the voting
of yet another package of austerity laws, was not achieved. And the acampadas
slowly faded, inside the riot police tear gas fogs and the traditionally hot
Greek summer.
3) from October 2011 to May 2012: The “civil disobedience” period. After
the dismantlement of the indignados camps, what we witnessed was a diffusion of
the contention in fields where movement activity was uncommon. This included
personalized attacks against politicians in bars and trattorias, military
parades turning into popular protests and chasing away the officials, football
hooligans joining forces inside and outside the stadiums in protest, and
-perhaps most importantly- the massive unwillingness of various (even
non-politicized) parts of the society to conform with the austerity laws.
Whilst some formed movements of self-reduction and non-payment of the new
taxes, others connected back the electricity cut due to non-payment to the ENI,
some invaded the supermarkets and distributed goods, and others cancelled the
basic goods mediators, organizing horizontal networks of food distribution,
from the producer directly to the consumer.
It would be unfair to say that the Greeks did not mobilize; they did. In
June 2011, for example, more than 20% of the population participated in
protests and demonstrations. For Italy, that would make 12 million people. Even
the political status quo in Greece has dramatically changed, as the elections
of May and June have clearly shown. The formerly governing Social-democratic
party (the Greek equivalent of Partito Democratico) has virtually disappeared,
losing almost 75% of its votes and 90% of its seats in the parliament. The
conservative right-wing party scored an all-time low, and managed to form a
government only through a fragile alliance with its former social-democrat
adversaries. The leftist and communist forces, spearheaded by the
movement-friendly, moderate left-wing party SYRIZA, gathered in sum more than
35% in the last elections. This is an unbelievable score for Greece, where, for
the last 40 years, the left had never gathered more than 15%. Finally, the
neo-Nazi party “Golden Dawn” entered the parliament with an impressive 7% of
the votes.
To sum up, what we witness is an evident polarization towards the
extremes of the political spectrum, and the weakening of the traditional
political entities.
Yet, and despite the electoral rise of the left the objective goal of
the movements – blocking the austerity measures – was not achieved. And the
newly elected government is once again a pro-austerity government.
Three months ago, if we would try to analyze the reasons of this
failure, we would commence from the lack of political representation and a
clear ideology which could transform a series of protests into viable solutions
for the future. This argument is no longer valid. SYRIZA, staging a clever
electoral campaign, managed to unite the vast majority of the activists in its
ranks. Yet “unity over the ballot box” does not necessarily mean common
political ideologies. And a great number of people are afraid that the party
they voted for will quickly transform itself into a traditional
social-democratic one, forgetting about the claims for a radical transformation
of the society and the economy. We have to wait and see, although the early
signs are not leaving too much space for optimism.
Returning to the initial question, though, one could identify today
three important reasons for the movements’ failure:
1) The lack of flexibility and adaptability: It took one whole year to
the movements to realize that what they were dealing with in the past was by no
means comparable to the present situation. c) the lack of international
co-ordination and mobilizing which could increase pressure in the other EU
countries to abolish the neo-liberal measures. The latter were presented as a
procedure without alternative, taking place europe-wide, and strengthened
incredibly the arguments of the government, the media and their porte-paroles inside
the society.
2) The fact that the opponent proved stronger than expected. The
Italians, during the Berlusconi days, used to complain about the monolithic
propaganda they received from the mainstream media. Yet even the Berlusconian
empire cannot compare to the unbelievable, terrorizing, pro-austerity mantra
the Greeks have been put up to during the IMF years, from literally all mass
media, all TV stations (state and public), all radio stations and all
newspapers, national and local. This exceptional resource mobilization on
behalf of the elites was not perceived on time, and the movements' response was
both late and weak.
3) The lack of international co-ordination and mobilizing which could
increase pressure in the other EU countries to abolish the neo-liberal
measures. The latter were presented as a procedure without alternative, taking place Europe-wide, and strengthened
incredibly the arguments of the government, the media and their porte-paroles
inside the society.
With regard to the third point: when I'm talking about international
co-ordination and co-operation, I 'm not referring to a charity-like solidarity
that should be expressed to the suffering Greek population, perhaps for
humanitarian reasons.
Take for example the slogan “We are all Greeks”.
We could not possibly identify with all the Greek, with our politicians,
for example, our rich businessmen and all those who partied during the '90s and
now call for austerity whilst checking their bank account in Switzerland.
We identify ourselves with the non-privileged Italians, Spanish, Irish,
Portuguese, and Greeks, all those who did not benefit from the explosion of the
public and private debt during the last two decades, yet are today asked to pay
the bill, to bail out the greedy bankers, corrupt politicians and local mafias.
The infamous American investor, Warren Buffet, said once: “We have a class
war, and my class is winning”. The case of Greece is merely an episode in this
warfare. Unfortunately, the “class” variable was largely absent from the Greek
movements' analysis of the crisis. When invoked, it was either in ridiculously
old-fashioned terms (such was the case of the Communist Party of Greece, which
was literally destroyed by SYRIZA, paying the price for its unwillingness to
participate in movements it did not
control), or it was presented in the caricature of the “national unity”,
where ultra-nationalists and ultra-leftists would fight the police side by side
for the whole day, only to realize -when the tear gas clouds dissolved and peace
was again restored- that their political projects were absolutely incompatible.
Although it is impossible to foresee the end of this Greek Tragedy, it
is quite clear that what we are witnessing is the beginning of a new chapter.
As the European South is going deeper every day into the crisis, and the new
political scenery in Greece opens up new opportunities and produces new
challenges for its movements, perhaps it is the time to reverse Buffet’s
saying:
…This is a class war. And it is time for our class to win!
(*)
“Collettivo
Prezzemolo” is an International group of students and researchers coming from
different countries and bringing a variety of experiences and knowledge of the
current crisis. “What brings us together is the awareness that, while our
governments cooperate in responding to the crisis in an anti-democratic and
reactionary way, movements opposing these reforms remain in a state of
isolation and fragmentation”. The aim of “Collettivo Prezzemolo” is to create a
network of contacts, experiences and knowledge for the anti-crisis movements to
be able to coordinate their strategies towards a project of transnational
resistance.